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NOTES
Bankruptcy"-Liquidating Agents and the Fifth Act of Bankruptcy
Before a creditor can place a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy,
he must allege and prove that the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy.' While this requirement has been criticized as being detrimental to the achievement of bankruptcy objectives, 2 it continues to be
an essential element in creditors' attempts to invoke bankruptcy proceedings. Section 3a3 of the Bankruptcy Act4 lists the six different
acts that permit creditors to file a petition in involuntary bankruptcy.5
If a person, "while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature,
procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property,",, he
has committed the fifth act of bankruptcy. In Blair & Co. v. Foley7 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the appointment of a
liquidating agent under a private liquidation agreement did not constitute the appointment of a receiver or trustee within the meaning of
section 3a(5). In so doing, the Second Circuit appears to have given
section 3a(5) a construction not intended by Congress.
Because of operating losses and capital shrinkage, Blair & Co., a
member of the New York Stock Exchange, decided to undertake a
self-liquidation program. To prevent losses to its customers, Blair
sought the aid of the Special Trust Fund,' established by the New York
1. This is not the only requirement. The petition for involuntary bankruptcy
must be filed by three creditors holding provable claims of at least $500 against a
debtor owing $1,000 or more, and the debtor must also be susceptible to an involuntary
petition under Bankruptcy Act § 4b, 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970). See D. CowANs,
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 882 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CowANs].
2. See J. MAcLAcHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 64-66
(1956); Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy
Law, 52 HAv.L. REv. 189 (1938) [hereinafter cited as ThEnMAN]; Note, "Acts of
Bankruptcy" in Perspective, 67 HAav. L. REv. 500 (1954).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970).
4. Bankruptcy Act is the short title given to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970),
which governs all bankruptcy proceedings.
5. An act of bankruptcy is not to be confused with the Bankruptcy Act or
any other piece of legislation dealing with bankruptcy. It simply refers to one of the
six enumerated events which must have occurred before involuntary proceedings can
be brought against a debtor. For a discussion of the origins of the act of bankruptcy
requirement see ThEnmN.

6. BankruptcyAct § 3a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1970).
7. 471 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 93 S.Ct. 1901 (1973) (No. 1154).
8. See Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, art. XIX, § 1, 2 CCIl
NEw YoRK STOCK ExcANCE GUIDE § 1841 (1972).
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Stock Exchange to assist member firms in avoiding bankruptcy. In
exchange for loans and guarantees from the Fund, the trustees of the
New York Stock Exchange were given the right to appoint a liquidator
of their own choosing. The agreement entered into by Blair with
the New York Stock Exchange gave the liquidator effective control of
the corporation for the purpose of completing the liquidation process.9
Shortly after the appointment, creditors of Blair filed an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy against the corporation in which they alleged
that Blair's consent to the agreement constituted the fifth act of bankruptcy. 10 The creditors' motion for summary adjudication was
granted by the referee and upheld by the district court." On appeal
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the appointment of a liquidator
did not constitute an appointment of a "receiver or trustee" within the
meaning of section 3a(5) of the Act.
The appointment of a receiver or trustee to administer the property of an insolvent person was not specified as an act of bankruptcy in
section 3a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.12 However, a few courts liberally construed a clause in that section to find that the appointment
of such an individual amounted to an assignment for the benefit of creditors (the fourth act of bankruptcy). 3 Expressing approval of these
9. Paragraph VIII of the agreement described the powers and duties of the
liquidating agent as set forth below.
Immediately following his appointment by the Exchange, the Liquidator shall
take control of the business and property of the Corporation for the purpose
of liquidating the business of the Corporation and shall proceed as follows
in connection with the liquidation:
i.) he shall promptly take such steps as he may deem practicable to reduce
the Corporation's operating expenses and to dispose of the Corporation's
salable assets;
ii.) he shall have power to retain independent public accounts, consultants,
counsel and other agents and assistants and shall have power to augment
and reduce or eliminate the staff of the Corporation;
iii.) he shall, as soon as practicable, assert and collect or settle all claims
and rights of the Corporation;
iv.) he shall pay any claim against the Corporation considered by him to
be a valid claim of any customer of the Corporation;
v.) he shall take such other steps as he deems necessary or appropriate to
liquidate the business of the Corporation.
It is agreed that consistent with the duty of the Liquidator to effect a fair
and orderly liquidation of the business of the Corporation to enable prompt
settlement with its customers, the Liquidator shall act in accordance with
what he deems to be good business practice.
471 F.2d at 179-80 n.1.
10. Two other acts of bankruptcy were also alleged in the petition but were
dismissed by the court as no serious effort had been made to support them before the
referee, before the district court, or on appeal to the Second Circuit. Id. at 180 & n.2.
11. Id. at 180.
12. Ch1.541, § 3a, 30 Stat. 546 (1898).
13. Scheuer v. Smith & Montgomery Book & Stationery Co., 112 F. 407 (5th Cir.
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minority decisions, Congress amended section 3a in 1903 specifically
to include the appointment of a receiver or trustee as an act of bankruptcy;1 4 but the wording of the 1903 amendment created several new
problems. It distinguished between voluntary and involuntary receivers, required an examination in some cases of why the receivers were
appointed, and left unclear whether insolvency was used in the bankruptcy sense (greater liabilities than assets) or the equity sense (inability to pay one's debts as they mature). In an attempt to remedy
these problems, section 3a was once more amended in 1926.15 Congress again failed to clarify the definition of insolvency, however, which
allowed many failing businesses to use equity receiverships to avoid
bankruptcy administration. To correct this abuse, Congress put section 3a(5) into its present form by including both definitions of insolvency in the Chandler Act of 1938.16
A receiver is typically defined as a person who is appointed by
a court for the purpose of collecting, caring for, and administering the
property of another, and he is usually regarded as an officer of the
court.17 The normal definition of a trustee is a person who holds legal
title for another.' 8 Because Blair's liquidator was privately appointed
and did not maintain legal title to the property and because a review of
the amendments dealing with the fifth act revealed no intent on the
part of Congress to extend the words "receiver or trustee" beyond their
normally understood definitions, the court reasoned that it could not
construe section 3a(5) to include the appointment of a liquidating
agent. The court found further support for its reading of section 3a
(5) in two other sections of the Bankruptcy Act, section 2a(21) 19
and section 69d.10 Both sections refer to liquidating agents as well as re1901); In re Macon Sash, Door & Lumber Co., 112 F. 323 (S.D. Ga. 1901), rev'd
sub nom. Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., 113 F. 483 (5th Cir. 1902).
14. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 2, 32 Stat. 797.
15. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 3, 44 Stat. 662-63.
16. Ch. 575, § 3(a), 52 Stat. 844-45 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1970)).
17. 1 R. CLAnT,A TIEATSE ON THE LAw AND PRACTIcE OF RECEVERs § Ila (3d
ed. 1959). There are other types of receivers, but the court in Blair chose to interpret the word to mean a court-appointed receiver. For a discussion of the different
kinds of receivers see id. at § 11-45.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 3(3) (1959).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1970).
This section authorizes the bankruptcy
court to "[require receivers or trustees appointed in proceedings not under this Act,
assignees for the benefit of creditors, and agents authorized to take possession of or to
liquidate a person's property to deliver the property in their possession or under their
control" to the bankruptcy court.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1970). The relevant portion reads as follows: "Upon
the filing of a petition under this Act, a receiver or trustee, appointed in proceedings
not under this Act, of any of the property of a bankrupt, an assignee fQr the benefit of
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ceivers and trustees, indicating to the court that when "the draftsmen

desired to cover such an agent, they considered it necessary to say so
'2 1
and knew how to do it."

The Blair court's construction of "receiver or trustee" is a study in
contrast to other decisions interpreting section 3a(5). The concern
of prior decisions has been with the scope of the appointee's powers and the purpose for which he was put in charge of the debtor's as-

sets. To this end, courts have uniformly defined "receiver" to be simply one who is appointed over all the debtor's property for the purpose
of liquidation.22 Thus, where the receiver was placed in charge of only
a portion of the debtor's property23 or where the receivership was to

24
foreclose on a mortgage or to enforce a lien on particular property,

the appointment was held not to constitute an act of bankruptcy under
section 3a(5) .25 The courts have likewise defined "trustee" to mean

someone who has effective control of a debtor's assets for the purpose
of liquidation.2 6 In fact, many courts use the words "trustee" and "receiver" interchangeably in discussing section 3a(5).
Significantly, the vesting of legal title does not seem to be crucial to the definition of trustee under the fifth act of bankruptcy. A
leading case in this respect is Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 28 in which the assets of a bank were placed, by resolution of
its directors, under the control of the State Superintendent of Banking for
the purpose of liquidation. The United States Supreme Court held that
creditors of a bankrupt, or an agent authorized to take possession of or to liquidate
any of the property of a bankrupt shall be accountable to the bankruptcy court. .. .
21. 471 F.2d at 183.
22. E.g., Steams & Foster Co. v. Pacific Bowling & Billiard Co., 391 F.2d 750,
752 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that the Supreme Court had reserved a ruling on this
issue on three separate occasions); Otis Elevator Co. v. Monks, 191 F.2d 1000, 1002
(1st Cir. 1951); Elfast v. Lamb, 111 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1940). But see In re
211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (N.D. I1. 1936).
23. Tatum v. Acadian Prod. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 40, 48 (E.D. La. 1940).
24. Central Fibre Prod. Co. v. Hardin, 82 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1936); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. E.T. Sheftall & Co., 53 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1931); cf.
Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 222-23 (1935).
25. It also seems where the purpose of a receiver is to force removal of the
present management of a corporation rather than to liquidate the corporation, the
appointment will not be deemed an act of bankruptcy. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.502 n.2, at 499 (14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1971) [hereinafter cited as Collier].
26. id.
3.502, at 501; C. NADLER, Tim LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 461 (2d ed.
S. Nadler & M. Nadler 1965).
27. C. NADLER, supra note 26, § 461; see, e.g., Haubtman & Loeb Co. v. Dunbar
Molasses Co., 13 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1926); Bramwell v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 299 F. 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1924), alrd, 269 U.S. 483 (1926); In re
Metallic Bedstead Co., 98 F. 981, 982 (2d Cir. 1899).
28. 269 U.S. 483 (1926).
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in so doing the bank had committed the fifth act of bankruptcy. The
Court said that the State Superintendent constituted a trustee within the
meaning of section 3a(5) because "[aippellant's duties were in substance the same as those of a trustee having the legal title of property
for the purpose of converting it into money to be paid over to specific
persons .... Appellant had a power that29 for present purposes had
the same effect as a title, and that is enough.
As in Bramwell, Blair's liquidator had the "power that for present purposes had the same effect as a title." He was given complete control of the corporation for the purpose of liquidation and had the
power to pass legal title of all the corporation's assets.8 0 Under the
facts of Blair the Second Circuit could have construed "trustee" to
include a liquidating agent whose powers were as extensive as Blair's
liquidator.
Blair's reluctance to construe section 3a(5) liberally stemmed
from its interpretation of the policy underlying the requirement of an
act of bankruptcy as a condition precedent to involuntary proceedings.
The purpose of the requirement, according to the court, is to afford
"protection against arbitrary or unjust interference with the property
of the debtor by providing that he shall not be amenable to bankruptcy
at the instance of creditors unless he has done, or suffered to be done,
certain acts, principally concerning his property."' ' - The court seemed
to fear that if it held Blair's liquidator to be within the scope of section
3a(5), it would be intruding on Blair's right to deal freely with its
corporate assets. But once a debtor becomes insolvent, there are
other considerations that suggest that a liberal construction of section
3a(5) would be appropriate. One of the principal objectives of the
Bankruptcy Act is to preserve the bankrupt's assets in order to provide
an equitable distribution of the assets among the bankrupt's creditors
through a uniform proceeding administered by the bankruptcy courts."
Once insolvent, a debtor's property becomes susceptible to rapid dismemberment by creditors seeking to recover their interests. This typically results in a "first come, first served" liquidation process in which
the insolvent's assets are taken by the larger, more efficient creditors at
the expense of the smaller ones. If an act of bankruptcy has occurred,
29. Id. at 491.
30. See note 9 supra.
31.

471 F.2d at 180, quoting 1 COLLIER

3.03, at 403.

32. See, e.g., Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945); Lewis v. Fitzgerald, 295 F.2d 877, 878 (10th Cir. 1961); District of Columbia v. Greenbaum, 223 F.2d
633, 636-37 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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the debtor has manifested that he is no longer able or willing to protect his creditors' rights in his property. 83 Thus, one purpose for
enumerating the six acts of bankruptcy in section 3a was to provide objective criteria for determining when the debtor should be required
to submit to bankruptcy jurisdiction. 4
The appointment of Blair's liquidator was an indication that the
interests of Blair's creditors were endangered. The corporate assets
were being liquidated under the control of a representative of the trustees of the New York Stock Exchange"3 whose interest in a failing member firm would be considerably different than the interests of the
firm's creditors. The liquidation of an insolvent business was being
conducted without the safeguards and uniformity provided by Congress
in the Bankruptcy Act for the protection of creditors. If the act requirements are to serve as indicators that creditors' interests are endangered, as well as to protect the debtor's free use of his property, a
liberal construction of section 3a(5) appears preferable and more
likely to achieve the objectives of the Bankruptcy Act. Such a conclusion was reached twenty years ago in In re Bonnie Classics, Inc."
In that case the directors of a corporation filed, as required by New
York law, for a certificate of dissolution and were appointed trustees
of the business for the purpose of making proper distribution of the
corporate assets to creditors and shareholders. The directors opposed
a petition for involuntary bankruptcy on the grounds that their appointment did not come within the meaning of section 3a(5). The
court concluded:
Any action by one who is insolvent which effectively causes
the transfer of his property to another for final liquidation purposes appoints the transferee a "trustee to take charge of his property" under § 3, sub. a(5) .

. .

. Any other construction would

defeat the objectives of the Bankruptcy Act and abort the broad
powers of the courts of bankruptcy
intended for the uniform administration of insolvent estates.37

33. Cf. 1 COLLIER
3.03, at 402-03: "These acts usually amount either to actual or constructive frauds on creditors, or are tantamount to declarations of insolvency."
34. See COWANS § 1063; 1 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAW OF THE UNrED STATES § 109 (5th ed. 1950); Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L.J. 683, 708 (1948).
35. See paragraph VIII of the agreement between Blair & Co. and the Special
Trust Fund cited note 9 supra.
36. 116 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
37. Id. at 648. The Blair court distinguished Bonnie Classics by noting that
there the directors were given legal title, while Blair's liquidator was not. But see
text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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The Blair court may have felt compelled to define "receiver" and

"trustee" narrowly because of its analysis of the history of section 3a
(5) and its interpretation of sections 2a(21) and 69d.1s However,
the differences between sections 3a(5), 2a(21), and 69d do not neces-

sarily evidence a Congressional intent to distinguish between receivers,
trustees, and liquidating agents.

The references to receivers, trustees,

assignees, and liquidating agents in both section 2a(21) and section
69d were added to the Bankruptcy Act to clarify the bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction and authority over these non-bankruptcy appointed

"liquidation officers." 3 9 At the time of these legislative additions,
there were no reported decisions holding that a privately appointed

liquidating agent, who otherwise met the qualifications of section 3a
(5), did not come within the meaning of "receiver or trustee.

' 40

In

the absence of uncertainty in regard to section 3a(5) and liquidating
agents, such as that which existed in regard to section 2a(21) and sec-

tion 69d, Congress may not have felt it necessary to amend the fifth
act of bankruptcy. 41 The very fact that liquidating agents were
grouped with receivers, trustees, and assignees in section 2a(21) and

section 69d is significant in this respect. The appointment of any one
of the latter three indicates the occurrence of the fourth or fifth act of

bankruptcy. 42

This suggests that, in listing all four liquidation offi-

cers together, Congress indicated an understanding that the appoint-

ment of a liquidating agent was already within one of the acts of bankruptcy just as the other three were.

The Second Circuit adopted a strict construction of section 3a(5)
38. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
39. 1 COLLIER 2.77; 4 id. 169.01[3).
40. This may be due to the fact that many bankruptcy decisions are not appealed from the referee's decisions and thus go unreported.
41. While this might indicate carelessness on the part of Congressional draftsmen, failure to amend uniformly where there is no intent to create discrepancies in
meaning is not untypical of the Bankruptcy Act amendments. Witness sections 2a
(21) and 69d. Both sections are designed to deal with the same individuals; yet
when Congress added liquidating agents to § 2a(21), it failed to do the same to
§ 69d. It was not until 1952 that Congress corrected this discrepancy. See 4
69.01[3]. There is other evidence suggesting that "receiver or trustee" can
COLLIER
be defined to include liquidating agents though the words cannot be read to include such an agent when found in other sections of the Bankruptcy Act. Emil v.
Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 522 (1943) (the Court sanctioned a distributive definition of
the word "receiver" when found in different sections of the Act when such an interpretation was necessary to prevent a misreading of Congressional intent). The wording of § 69d reveals further support. In § 69d "receiver" and "trustee" are defined to
include a receiver or trustee appointed over only a portion of the debtor's property;
whereas "receiver" and "trustee" have been defined by the courts to mean only a receiver or trustee put in charge of all the debtor's property. Cases cited note 22 supra.
42. 11 U.S.C. H9 21a(4)-(5) (1970).
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in Blair to conform with the specific policy that it perceived behind the
fourth and fifth acts of bankruptcy. 43 Under the court's analysis a receiver is typically viewed as an appointed officer of the court and a
trustee is considered to have legal title to the property he holds. Therefore if the debtor's property were in the possession of either individual,
the debtor's creditors would be required to proceed in one manner or
another against the receiver or trustee as well as the debtor himself. The
court noted that this would also be true if there were a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, but not if the person possessing the
property were merely an agent. The policy behind section 3a(4) and
section 3a(5), the court said, is to allow creditors to invoke bankruptcy
relief only if the debtor has allowed such an obstacle to be placed in
the way of his creditor's claims. 4 4 Since the appointment of a liquidating agent has been held not to be an assignment for the benefit of
creditors4 5 and the policy behind the fourth and fifth acts was allegedly the same, the court failed to see why the appointment of a liquidating agent should constitute the fifth act.40
The problem with the court's analysis is that sections 3a(4) and
3a(5) are separate and distinct acts of bankruptcy. They are designed
to cover two different events that affect the debtor's property. The
conclusion that if a liquidating agent were not an assignee, he would
also not be a receiver or trustee seems to ignore a distinction specifically recognized by Congress. The court's policy argument also suggests that the court believed creditors were in a stronger position than
bankruptcy courts when it came to pursuing a claim against a debtor's liquidating agent, an opinion not shared by Congress. If a liquidator is truly nothing more than an agent of the debtor, the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over the debtor would provide the requisite jurisdiction over his agent.4 7 Yet sections 2a(21) and 69d were added to
the Bankruptcy Act in 1938 because "there was a real necessity for stating clearly what status non-bankruptcy liquidation officers occupy...
and the extent of the bankruptcy court's control over them."4 8 If, as
43. 471 F.2d at 181-82.
44. Id.
45. In re Ambrose Matthews & Co., 229 F. 309 (D.NJ.), a! 'd, 236 F. 539
(3d Cir. 1916). But see In re R.V. Smith, 38 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1941), which
held that the appointment of a liquidating trustee was an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Blair found its reasoning unpersuasive but did not say why.
46. 471 F.2d at 181-82.
47. See Reifsnyder v. B. Levy & Sons, 88 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1937); In re Muncie
Pulp Co., 139 F. 546 (2d Cir. 1905).
48. 4 COLLmR 69.01, at 1065.
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Blair reasoned, a liquidating agent presents no obstacles to ordinary
creditor's remedies, then one is left with the question of why Congress
felt it necessary to give bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over liquidating
agents. The answer appears to be that liquidating agents do present
an obstacle to ordinary creditor remedies. As in the case of receivers,
trustees, or assignees, Blair's liquidator had authority, by virtue of
the agreement between the corporation and the Special Trust Fund, to
liquidate the corporate assets as he saw fit and not according to Blair's
dictates. 49 Therefore, it would seem reasonable to treat the appointment of a liquidating agent whose powers were as extensive as Blair's
as the equivalent of a receiver or trustee. 50
While private liquidation agreements of brokerage firms are not
likely to present a section 3a(5) issue in the future,51 the Blair decision appears to have opened a door to a procedure which will permit
insolvent businesses to defeat the broad objectives of the Bankruptcy
Act. The court's decision will permit insolvent businesses to place effective control of the business's assets in the hands of private liquidating
agents and allow the liquidation process to be accomplished without
the safeguards and uniformity of administration provided for by the
Bankruptcy Act. The decision indicates that Congress will have to
amend section 3a(5) if it wants to prevent the subversion through private liquidation agreements of the creditors' ability to invoke bankruptcy proceedings.
STUART WILLIAMS

Civil Procedure-A Possible Solution to the Problem
of "Sewer Service" in Consumer Credit Actions
Notice of a lawsuit is one of the most important elements of an
individual's right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. 1
Nevertheless, each day in large cities thousands of default judgments
49. See note 9 supra.
50. See 1 COLLIER I 3.503, at 503.
51. Future problems involving the insolvency of brokerage firms will be handled by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1970).
See Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in
Investor Protection,24 VAND. L. REv. 586, 606-13 (1971).
1. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313-16 (1950).

